Working Papers
with Augustin Bergeron (Harvard), Joana Naritomi (LSE), Marina Ngoma (World Bank), Gabriel Tourek (UC Davis), and Jonathan Weigel (UC Berkeley)
Progressive taxation is central to high-income countries' tax systems, but developing countries typically
rely on less progressive instruments. We study the introduction of progressive property taxation in a large
Congolese city through a citywide field experiment conducted in partnership with the provincial government.
Neighborhoods were randomly assigned to a progressive or proportional schedule. The progressive schedule
increased revenue by 56% relative to the proportional one. Gains occurred throughout the property value
distribution: at the top, higher statutory rates mechanically raised revenue despite modest compliance
losses; at the bottom, lower rates induced compliance gains large enough to offset lower liabilities.
Cross-randomized information treatments show that taxpayers responded primarily to their own rates, not to
others' rates or to the perceived fairness of the overall schedule. Effective tax rates — taxes paid
as a share of property value — declined with property value and were most regressive under the
progressive schedule. However, after a progressive schedule was scaled up citywide in subsequent years,
targeted enforcement among high-value properties reversed this pattern, aligning statutory and effective
rates. Together, the results suggest that progressive property taxation can raise fiscal capacity in
low-income settings and, when paired with targeted enforcement, further shift the tax burden onto
wealthier property owners.
Research in Progress
Digitization and Tax Compliance with Cash-on-Hand Constraints in the DR Congo
with Sarah Danner (UC Berkeley), Marina Ngoma (World Bank), Dina Pomeranz (UZH), Gabriel Tourek (UC Davis) and Jonathan Weigel (UC Berkeley)
This project studies whether digital payment technologies can raise tax compliance and cost-effectiveness
in a low-capacity, low-trust tax authority. In a randomized field experiment conducted with the provincial
tax authority of Kasaï Central across roughly 60,000 properties, we cross-randomize a mobile money
payment option with in-person collection visits, an installment plan, and personalized deterrence
messaging. This design allows us to assess whether digital payment infrastructure can substitute for
costly in-person tax collection, or whether the two are complements, and to identify the most
cost-effective combination of interventions in a setting where compliance has historically depended on
face-to-face solicitation.
Land Rental Market Formalization, Tenure Security, and Investment in Uganda
with Manon Delvaux (UZH)
We study how formalizing verbal land rental agreements affects contractual clarity and agricultural
investment, using a randomized experiment with 514 matched landlord-tenant pairs in Uganda. Formalization
reduced contractual discrepancies by 30–50 percentage points and induced a shift toward
longer-maturity crops. Effects are concentrated among tenants with worse baseline mental health, consistent
with a present-bias channel, and structural mediation analysis attributes 60–70% of the investment
effect to the contractual clarity channel.
Bio-diversity and Conflict: Evidence from African Wildlife Tourism
with Iddo Glass (PSE), Francois Libois (PSE, INRAE), Guy Pincus (LBS) and Oliver Vanden Eynde (PSE, CNRS, CEPR)
We examine how wildlife-based tourism affects local conflict dynamics across Sub-Saharan Africa. Combining species range data,
citizen-science records of visitor activity, and georeferenced conflict events at a fine spatial resolution, we build a panel
measure of nature-based tourism exposure and relate it to the incidence and intensity of violence. The project speaks to the
broader literature on natural resources, environmental shocks, and armed conflict.