Working Papers

with Augustin Bergeron (Harvard), Joana Naritomi (LSE), Marina Ngoma (World Bank), Gabriel Tourek (UC Davis), and Jonathan Weigel (UC Berkeley)
Submitted. NBER WP 35536
Progressive taxation is central to high-income countries' tax systems, but developing countries typically rely on less progressive instruments. We study the introduction of progressive property taxation in a large Congolese city through a citywide field experiment conducted in partnership with the provincial government. Neighborhoods were randomly assigned to a progressive or proportional schedule. The progressive schedule increased revenue by 56% relative to the proportional one. Gains occurred throughout the property value distribution: at the top, higher statutory rates mechanically raised revenue despite modest compliance losses; at the bottom, lower rates induced compliance gains large enough to offset lower liabilities. Cross-randomized information treatments show that taxpayers responded primarily to their own rates, not to others' rates or to the perceived fairness of the overall schedule. Effective tax rates — taxes paid as a share of property value — declined with property value and were most regressive under the progressive schedule. However, after a progressive schedule was scaled up citywide in subsequent years, targeted enforcement among high-value properties reversed this pattern, aligning statutory and effective rates. Together, the results suggest that progressive property taxation can raise fiscal capacity in low-income settings and, when paired with targeted enforcement, further shift the tax burden onto wealthier property owners.

Research in Progress

Digitization and Tax Compliance with Cash-on-Hand Constraints in the DR Congo
with Sarah Danner (UC Berkeley), Marina Ngoma (World Bank), Dina Pomeranz (UZH), Gabriel Tourek (UC Davis) and Jonathan Weigel (UC Berkeley)
This project studies whether digital payment technologies can raise tax compliance and cost-effectiveness in a low-capacity, low-trust tax authority. In a randomized field experiment conducted with the provincial tax authority of Kasaï Central across roughly 60,000 properties, we cross-randomize a mobile money payment option with in-person collection visits, an installment plan, and personalized deterrence messaging. This design allows us to assess whether digital payment infrastructure can substitute for costly in-person tax collection, or whether the two are complements, and to identify the most cost-effective combination of interventions in a setting where compliance has historically depended on face-to-face solicitation.
Land Rental Market Formalization, Tenure Security, and Investment in Uganda
with Manon Delvaux (UZH)
We study how formalizing verbal land rental agreements affects contractual clarity and agricultural investment, using a randomized experiment with 514 matched landlord-tenant pairs in Uganda. Formalization reduced contractual discrepancies by 30–50 percentage points and induced a shift toward longer-maturity crops. Effects are concentrated among tenants with worse baseline mental health, consistent with a present-bias channel, and structural mediation analysis attributes 60–70% of the investment effect to the contractual clarity channel.
Bio-diversity and Conflict: Evidence from African Wildlife Tourism
with Iddo Glass (PSE), Francois Libois (PSE, INRAE), Guy Pincus (LBS) and Oliver Vanden Eynde (PSE, CNRS, CEPR)
We examine how wildlife-based tourism affects local conflict dynamics across Sub-Saharan Africa. Combining species range data, citizen-science records of visitor activity, and georeferenced conflict events at a fine spatial resolution, we build a panel measure of nature-based tourism exposure and relate it to the incidence and intensity of violence. The project speaks to the broader literature on natural resources, environmental shocks, and armed conflict.